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Beyond Administrative Tunnel Vision:
Widening the Lens of Costs and Benefits
GOVIND PERSAD*
ABSTRACT

Choices in one sector or department of public policy, such as health, frequently produce costs and benefits in other sectors, such as education or the
environment. In this article, I argue that administrators should not make
decisions in ways that ignore effects on other policy sectors, and arguablythough more debatably-should not give specialpriority to the interests of their
own sector In Part I, I review contexts where administratorsare directed to
ignore or give a lower priority to effects on other policy sectors. In PartII, I lay
out an argument that agencies should not ignore these effects (using an example
from health policy), and consider potential responses to that argument. In Part
III, I consider some strategies to remedy the problem of agencies giving
insufficient weight to wide-scope costs and benefits.
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INTRODUCTION

Choices in one sector or department of public policy, such as health, frequently produce costs and benefits in other sectors, such as education or the
environment. This article considers what weight public policy should give to
such benefits, and argues that this weight should be greater than zero, and
arguably should be the same regardless of sector.
Some assert that administrative agencies each pursue disparate goals, giving
little weight to aims outside their sector. This view is exemplified by Robert
Goodin's claim that "it is the Health Minister's job to look after health, and
spend her money however best promotes health; any spillovers to non health
matters, be they positive or negative, are naturally neglected by her on the
grounds 'that's not my department."' Daniel Hausman similarly claims that
"contemporary governments assign different goals to different sectors." 2 Depending on how strong the neglect in question is, this approach can be conceptualized in either of these two ways:
* No Consideration approaches to public policy involve a given policy
sector, e.g. the health ministry, giving no weight at all to benefits and
costs outside of that sector. (In what follows, I will call such costs and
benefits "wide-scope").
* Unequal Considerationapproaches have policy sectors give less weight
to wide-scope costs and benefits.
If understood as describing how administrators do make decisions, Goodin
and Hausman may be correct. But their observations do not support the claim
that administrators should make decisions this way.
In this article, I will argue that administrators should not make decisions in
ways that ignore effects on other policy sectors, and arguably-though more
debatably-should not give special priority to the interests of their own sector. I

1. Dan W. Brock, Separate Spheres and Indirect Benefits, 1 COST EFFECTIVENESS AND RESOURCE
ALLOCATION 1 (2003).
2. Daniel M. Hausman, Health, Well-being, andMeasuring the Burden of Disease, in 10 POPULATION
HEALTH METRICS 13 (2012).
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develop this argument as follows. In Part I, I review contexts where administrators are directed to ignore or give a lower priority to effects on other policy
sectors. In Part II, I lay out an argument that agencies should not ignore these
effects (using an example from health policy), and consider potential responses
to that argument. In Part III, I consider some strategies to remedy the problem
of agencies giving insufficient weight to wide-scope costs and benefits.
I. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE DANGER OF TUNNEL VISION

Hausman's and Goodin's observations regarding the tendency of administrative agencies to ignore wide-scope benefits are anecdotal ones, and do not
examine in depth the mechanisms producing this phenomenon. In this Part, I
review statutory language and other factors that may encourage agencies to
ignore wide-scope benefits. Though my focus is on the United States, it would
also be valuable in future work to examine similarities and differences with
other nations' administrative law, and with international administrative agencies.
A. FederalAdministrative Agencies
The enabling language creating most federal agencies in the United States
focuses on their responsibility to promote specific aims, rather than their
responsibility to serve the public good in general using the means at their
disposal. An example is the Department of Agriculture's enabling statute, which
reads:
There shall be at the seat of government a Department of Agriculture, the
general design and duties of which shall be to acquire and to diffuse among
the people of the United States useful information on subjects connected with
agriculture, rural development, aquaculture, and human nutrition, in the most
general and comprehensive sense of those terms, and to procure, propagate,
and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants. 3
The statute goes on to direct the agency head that "he shall advise the
President, other members of his Cabinet, and the Congress on policies and
programs designed to improve the quality of life for people living in the rural
and nonmetropolitan regions of the Nation." 4 Here, the focus is not on improving overall quality of life, but on improving the quality of life for particular
groups.
Similarly narrow goals are provided for other agencies. The Department of
Commerce's goal is to "foster, promote, and develop the foreign and domestic
commerce, the mining, manufacturing, and fishery industries of the United
States." 5 "The purpose of the Department of Labor shall be to foster, promote,

3. 7 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
4. 7 U.S.C. § 2204 (2012).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012).
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and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States, to improve
their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable
employment."6 The specific goals prescribed for these agencies pose a clear
danger of agencies working at cross purposes, as will be discussed in Part II: for
instance, for the Department of Labor to promulgate labor policies without
consideration of their impact on industry, or for the Department of Commerce to
promulgate industrial policies without consideration of their effects on workers.
Even agencies without explicit purposes are frequently organized around a
fairly narrow goal. For instance, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is directed to perform a variety of tasks, but almost all specifically concern
housing and urban development.
The enabling acts for certain agencies, however-particularly those created
later on-do gesture toward the importance of using agency power to promote
the public good more generally. For instance, the enabling statute for the
Department of Energy asserts that "the establishment of a Department of
Energy is in the public interest and will promote the general welfare by assuring
coordinated and effective administration of Federal energy policy and programs."" Though this language may appear to be mere window-dressing, it
signals a subtle shift toward a concern with achieving the public good more
broadly: rather than having the purpose of providing information about a
particular topic or of advancing a specific aim, the Department of Energy-at
least on paper-is charged with using energy policy to promote the "general
welfare." There is similar language concerning the Department of Education,
though that language is vaguer, stating that the department's purpose is to
promote the general welfare but not explaining how it is to coordinate policy to
bring that end about. 9 The Department of Transportation is charged with the
"development of transportation policies and programs that contribute to providing fast, safe, efficient, and convenient transportation at the lowest cost consistent with those and other national objectives, including the efficient use and
conservation of the resources of the United States."o One of the newest
agencies, the Department of Homeland Security, has as a primary mission the
obligation to "ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is
not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the
homeland."
However, even the Departments of Education and Energy have language that
seemingly directs them to place special emphasis on their own sector. The
Department of Energy, for instance, is directed to "assure, to the maximum
extent practicable, that the productive capacity of private enterprise shall be

6. 29 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 3532(b) (2012).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 7112 (2012).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012).
10. 49 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
11. 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(F) (2012).
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utilized in the development and achievement of the policies and purposes of this
chapter," 1 2 and to "foster insofar as possible the continued good health of the
Nation's small business firms, public utility districts, municipal utilities, and
private cooperatives involved in energy production, transportation, research,
development, demonstration, marketing, and merchandising." 1 3 Whether this
language favors narrow-scoped benefits depends on the interpretation of "maximum extent practicable" and "insofar as possible." If the language of the
enabling statute is interpreted to direct agencies to pursue the listed goals until
they are strictly impracticable or impossible, regardless of their effect on the
general welfare, then it will end up favoring narrow-scoped benefits, whereas if
impracticability and impossibility are viewed in light of the agencies' duty to
promote the general welfare, they need not have this bad effect.
B. State and Local Agencies
There are many more state and local public administrative agencies than there
are federal agencies, and states use a variety of models for managing them.1 4 As
an example, a recent article on Pennsylvania's state administrative agencies
notes that:
A very limited list of admirable purposes includes items as diverse and varied
as building roads "to get the farmer out of the mud" (Gifford Pinchot's
campaign promise in 1930); running an ever-expanding prison system; providing benefits to the needy and the unemployed; protecting Pennsylvania's
natural resources; encouraging businesses to locate in Pennsylvania; helping
to fund the public education system; protecting Pennsylvania consumers from
unfair business practices; regulating public utilities; regulating the sale of
alcohol; and improving the health and welfare of Pennsylvania's citizens. 15
As the list above indicates, state and local public administrative agencies
frequently are given remits that are narrowly focused on promoting specific
ends. As such, they are likely to run into the same sorts of challenges discussed
with regard to the federal system.
C Non-Governmental Organizations
Non-governmental and quasi-non-governmental organizations are frequently
organized according to a "vertical" model, where each organization focuses on a

12. 42 U.S.C. § 7112(14) (2012).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7112(17) (2012).
14. See Katherine Shaw, State Administrative Constitutionalism, 69 ARK. L. REv. 527, 532-33
(2016) ("State administrative agencies' basic functions do not differ significantly from those of their
counterparts in the federal system: they issue regulations; they adjudicate; they engage in inspections;
they determine and grant benefits.... But there is nonetheless substantial variety within the states, and
divergence between states and the federal system, on fronts of structure, practice, and authority.")
15. Daniel R. Schuckers & Kyle Applegate, The Rise of Pennsylvania'sAdministrativeAgencies and
Legislative and JudicialAttempts to ConstrainThem, 81 PA. B.A. Q. 124, 126 (2010).
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specific problem. 16 For instance, non-governmental organizations focusing on
health tend to target specific conditions or organ systems-see, for instance, the
American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, American Kidney Association, and so on. This vertical model can produce problems in which each
organization pursues its own aims without concern for the general good. For
instance, non-governmental organizations involved in development in poorer
nations have hired skilled workers away from other societal goals, potentially
undermining the public good even as they promote the good of specific sectors.

11.

THE

GIFT OF THE

MAGI PROBLEM: WHY ADMINISTRATIVE TUNNEL VISION IS
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

To see how administrative agencies could create suboptimal outcomes by
ignoring wide-scope costs and benefits, consider the following example. Introducing an invasive insectivore species could reduce the incidence of insect-borne
disease, but would do so at a high cost to ecosystems. A health ministry that
ignores wide-scope costs and benefits would order that the predator be introduced with no concern for its ecosystems. Meanwhile, the ministry responsible
for environmental protection would spend its own money to eradicate the
invasive species, without any concern for the insect-borne disease deaths caused
by its actions.
Agencies at such cross purposes recall not Smith's invisible hand, but rather
0. Henry's The Gift of the Magi, in which the husband sells his watch to buy his
wife hair ornaments, while his wife sells her hair to buy him a watch-chain. 1 7
This problem is clearest on the No Considerationversion of agency priorities,
but also occurs under Unequal Consideration views: having the ministry of
health give additional, rather than exclusive, weight to health benefits would
have similarly wasteful, albeit less drastic, consequences.
The problem of agencies at cross purposes will remind philosophers of a
well-known problem in decision theory, that of the money pump, a strategy for
taking advantage of the preferences of agents who have cycling or timeinconsistent preferences. A recent article neatly presents the problem:
Suppose Jones has a pint of vanilla ice cream. An ice-cream trader announces
that she will offer Jones the following series of trades. First, the trader will
offer Jones a pint of strawberry in return for her pint of vanilla and any
amount of money-Jones gets to name her price, as long as she pays
something. Next, the trader will offer Jones a pint of chocolate in return for
the pint of strawberry. Finally, the trader will offer back to Jones the original
pint of vanilla in return for the pint of chocolate.' 8

16. For an overview of this model, see

A. ATUN ET AL., WHEN Do VERTICAL (STAND-ALONE)
(2008).
17. See 0. Henry, The Gift of the Magi and Other Stories (1907), https://americanenglish.state.gov/
files/ae/resource files/1-the-gift of the-magi_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YE2-4MHC].
18. Tom Dougherty, On Whether to Prefer Painto Pass, 121 ETHICS 521, 523 (2011).
RiAT

PROGRAMMES HAVE A PLACE IN HEALTH SYSTEMS?
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If Jones prefers strawberry to vanilla, chocolate to strawberry, but vanilla to
chocolate, she is in danger of being turned into a "money pump"-a danger
faced more systematically by single individual agents with uncoordinated preferences. Similarly, the Gift of the Magi problem is a danger faced by uncoordinated but interdependent agents-such as an administrative regime comprised
of uncoordinated agencies.
The Gift of the Magi problem provides a strong reason not to ignore
wide-scope costs and benefits. This section will evaluate several arguments for
the conclusion that agencies should ignore wide-scope costs and benefits or give
them less weight:
(1) Agencies have a role obligation to focus on within-sector costs and

benefits.
(2) The purpose of the goods distributed by agencies is the provision of

certain types of benefits.
(3) The fact of separate spheres supports ignoring wide-scope benefits when

distributing a good within a given sphere.
(4) It would be impracticalfor agencies to consider wide-scope benefits.
A. Role Obligations
The claim that certain professionals are obliged to prioritize the provision of
narrow-scope benefits has been most debated at what we might call the "microlevel." This level involves direct interactions between professionals (such as
teachers, doctors, or lawyers) and their beneficiaries. The role obligations of
professionals are frequently seen as especially focused on promoting the interests of their direct beneficiaries, and on promoting their interests with respect to
the area of life in which the professional is expert. This is exemplified by the
"fiduciary" relationship professionals are supposed to have with their clients.
When deciding what aid to provide her client and how zealously to defend him,
a public defender is not supposed to consider the consequences for the broader
community. Furthermore, she is supposed to narrowly focus on the aim of
protecting his legal innocence. The same is frequently thought to be true for a
community physician deciding what treatment to provide a patient, or a social
worker deciding what placement would be best for a foster child.
One challenge to this model has contended that professionals should aim to
promote the interests of their clients more generally, rather than only promoting
their interests in the professional's sphere of expertise.1 9 This has engendered a
debate regarding what weight professionals such as physicians should give to
values other than health.

19. Robert M. Veatch, Doctor Does Not Know Best: Why in the New Century PhysiciansMust Stop
Trying to Benefit Patients,25 J. MED. & PHL. 701 (2000).
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Even if professionals' roles favor a narrow-scoped understanding of benefits,
however, public administrators likely have different role obligations. Public
administrators have no fiduciary obligation to specific individuals, nor do they
take a professional oath or vow to pursue narrow-scoped ends. Rather, the role
obligations of public administrators are most plausibly set by the political
process itself; if they have other role obligations, these-as discussed below in
Part Ill-are likely obligations to effectively and honestly promote the public
good.
The cases of public administrators who are also professionals, and of nongovernmental organizations, are somewhat more complex. However, the scope
of professional obligations depends on the role being played by the professional
in question. Taking a personal oath or vow to pursue a narrow-scoped goal must
frequently give way to the promotion of the public good: for instance, even if a
public administrator has vowed to prioritize her spouse's interest above all
others, her duties in her capacity as public administrator mean that she cannot
use the powers of her office to promote her spouse's interests over the public
good. Similarly, a public administrator who happens to also be a physician
cannot prioritize health over societal aims on the basis of her personal medical
oath.
B. The Purpose of What Is Distributed
The purpose or meaning of certain goods that administrators distribute may
appear to support ignoring wide-scope benefits. Frances Kamm has argued that
certain resources (such as medicines) should be used for the purpose for which
they are specifically designed. 2 0 However, Kamm's argument faces several
problems. First, no consensus exists regarding the purpose of many resources.2 1
Further, assigning moral weight to the purpose of certain resources seems
vulnerable to a variety of reductio ad absurdum arguments. For example, it
entails that there is a moral reason against an unjustly imprisoned prisoner using
dental floss and toothpaste to cut through her cell bars and escape, because she
is using the floss and toothpaste contrary to the purpose for which they were
specifically designed. In the public administration context, it would similarly
entail that there is a moral reason against using an extra ream of paper to prop
open a door to a legal aid facility in order to keep clients comfortable, rather
than using that paper to draft a brief in defense of a client.
Furthermore, policymakers distribute many resources that have no distinctive
end. As Dan Brock observes, when the resource being distributed is money, "no
direct argument that the distinctive end of what is being distributed is health
seems applicable." 22 The same seems true for many other resources, such as

20. F.M. KAMM, 1 MORALITY, MORTALITY: DEATH AND WHOM TO SAVE FROM IT (1993).
21. Jessica Du Toit & Joseph Millum, Are Indirect Benefits Relevant to Health Care Allocation
Decisions?, 41 J. MED. & PHL. 540 (2016).
22. Brock, supra note 1.
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legal protection or infrastructure. So even if a purpose-based argument like
Kamm's can survive the above objections, its applicability is limited.
C. Separate Spheres
Michael Walzer contends that different distributive principles apply to different sorts of goods: education should be distributed by different rules than
money, and health by a rule different from either.2 3 Some have tried to use
Walzer's "separate spheres" argument to support a narrow-scoped approach to
benefits. For instance, Dan Brock has argued that Walzer's argument can be
used to support the claim that health policy should aim to promote health, rather
than to promote other societal ends. However, such an interpretation of the
separate spheres approach confuses Walzer's stance that we should strive to
minimize the ways in which distributing some goods affects the distribution of
others with the much less plausible claim that we should ignore those effects
even if they exist. Walzer argues that we should publicly fund universal health
care in order to minimize the effects of health on other goods; it does not follow,
and Walzer does not argue, that in the absence of publicly-funded universal
health care, agencies should ignore the wide-scope effects of health on financial
well-being. Rather, we should ensure that health care provision does not (for
instance, through its costs) lead to a maldistribution of other goods.
D. Impracticality
Some have argued that considering wide-scope costs and benefits is an
impractical task that agencies cannot accomplish. These concerns have a long
pedigree in criticisms of utilitarian approaches to distributive justice: these
criticisms make the case that utilitarianism is impractical as a decision procedure, because it requires exhaustively assessing the costs and benefits of the
remotest and widest-scope consequences of each decision. In the context of
health policy, Brock raises a similar concern:
Restricting benefit assessment to direct health benefits has the practical
advantage of substantially limiting the scope of the assessment. Once we
begin giving weight to the indirect non health benefits of health interventions
there is no obvious stopping point stretching out in time and in non-health
domains beyond which we need not go. The more extensive the consequences
to which we give weight the more tenuous and unreliable our estimations of
them are likely to be. We risk soon finding ourselves giving significant weight
in health care allocation and prioritization choices to effects whose nature,
24
size, and probability are highly uncertain.
However, even if restricting the scope of assessment narrowly would make the
task of assessment easier, we cannot allow what we assess to diverge too far

23. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).

24. Brock, supra note 1.
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from what we actually value. To do so would be to fall victim to the "streetlight
effect" or "drunkard's search" fallacy, exemplified by the person who loses his
keys in a park, but searches for them under a streetlight outside the park,
because that's where the light is best. Even if accounting for wide-scope
benefits is difficult, ignoring them will make it difficult for policy to achieve
desirable outcomes.
III. WIDENING THE LENS: STRATEGIES FOR INCORPORATING WIDE-SCOPE BENEFITS
AND COSTS

Parts I and II have presented potential mechanisms leading to the neglect of
wide-scope benefits and costs, the problems that this neglect produces, and the
reasons why this neglect is not ethically justifiable. Part III will now consider
how that neglect might be remedied.
One answer I want to address at the outset is that the problem of "tunnel
vision"-the neglect of wide-scope costs and benefits-is best addressed by
paring back or eliminating administrative power. This argument would make the
case that public administrators have the wrong incentives, and that selfinterested actors in private markets would do a better job of producing the right
outcomes. While more could be done to give administrators the right incentives,
the privatization of public administration is a nonstarter. While private markets
do well at providing many types of goods, they are weak at providing public
goods and at dealing with externalities-and the problem faced by agencies is
precisely that of producing public goods while avoiding externalities. Furthermore, even setting aside the problems of public goods and externalities, there is
no reason to expect from economic theory that merely increasing the role of
markets within a mixed economy will produce better outcomes. 25 This is
particularly true given the myriad ways in which real-world contexts diverge
from the simplifying assumptions of economic theory. Accordingly, proposals to
defund or weaken public administration, or expect private-sector actors to fill in
gaps, must be evaluated through real-world empirical assessment. Privatization
would replace administrators who are well placed to produce public goods and
who could be given incentives to consider the positive and negative externalities
of their conduct with private actors who are ill placed to produce public goods
and lack incentives to deal with the externalities of their conduct. Rather than
throwing our hands up at the problem of tunnel vision, we would do better to
first try addressing that problem within the context of public administration.
A. The OMB/OIRA Approach: CoordinatedEvaluationof Wide-Scope Costs
and Benefits
One approach to the problem of tunnel vision would expand the use of a
single coordinating agency that examines all proposals coming from other

25. R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD.

11(1956).
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administrative agencies and assesses their overall costs and benefits, including
wide-scope costs and benefits. One model for this approach in the United States
is the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and, within it, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which conducts an economic
analysis of various proposed regulations from federal agencies. This authority
has been controversial, both among critics of regulation who object to the power
of an unelected agency to shape rules and among advocates for regulation who
argue that OMB and OIRA water down regulations that protect the public for
the benefit of industry. 26 Nonetheless, it has been maintained across several
presidential administrations and has been praised for producing good outcomes.
OMB has published a detailed document, Circular A-4, that provides guidance on its process for review of proposed regulations. Importantly, OMB
explicitly recognizes the importance of wide-scope benefits and costs, which it
refers to as "side-effects and ancillary benefits." 2 7 Circular A-4 states that
assessment of regulations requires identifying "the expected undesirable sideeffects and ancillary benefits of the proposed regulatory action and the alternatives," and notes that "[t]hese should be added to the direct benefits and costs as
appropriate."2 Later in the document, OMB provides a detailed framework for
identifying and assessing wide-scope benefits:
Your analysis should look beyond the direct benefits and direct costs of your
rulemaking and consider any important ancillary benefits and countervailing
risks. An ancillary benefit is a favorable impact of the rule that is typically
unrelated or secondary to the statutory purpose of the rulemaking (e.g.,
reduced refinery emissions due to more stringent fuel economy standards for
light trucks) while a countervailing risk is an adverse economic, health, safety,
or environmental consequence that occurs due to a rule and is not already
accounted for in the direct cost of the rule (e.g., adverse safety impacts from
more stringent fuel-economy standards for light trucks).
You should begin by considering and perhaps listing the possible ancillary
benefits and countervailing risks. However, highly speculative or minor consequences may not be worth further formal analysis. Analytic priority should be
given to those ancillary benefits and countervailing risks that are important
enough to potentially change the rank ordering of the main alternatives in the
analysis . . . Like other benefits and costs, an effort should be made to quan-

tify and monetize ancillary benefits and countervailing risks. If monetization
is not feasible, quantification should be attempted through use of informative
physical units. If both monetization and quantification are not feasible, then
these issues should be presented as non-quantified benefits and costs. The

26. See generally Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs

in FederalRulemaking, 33

FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 1257 (2006).

27. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB CIRCULAR No. A-4, at 3 (September 17, 2003), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf, [https://perma.cc/ZM7G-ARPW].
28. Id.
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same standards of information and analysis quality that apply to direct
benefits and costs should be applied to ancillary benefits and countervailing
risks.29
OMB also discusses different approaches to assessing risks and benefits, including cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). CBA
has the easiest time incorporating wide-scope benefits, since it converts all
categories of benefit to a common currency, monetary value, before comparing
them to costs. However, this ease comes with the challenge of securing agreement on the monetary value of benefits. While OMB suggests several methods
for valuing benefits in cost-benefit analysis, it concedes that not all benefits are
ultimately amenable to quantification. 3 0 Many critics of CBA, meanwhile, have
offered more searching criticisms that call its appropriateness as a tool for
policy evaluation into question. They have charged that CBA relies on a
controversial utilitarian philosophical framework, and that it provides an inadequate basis for its claims.3 1
CEA, in contrast, has a more difficult time incorporating wide-scope benefits.
Traditional CEA assesses policies in terms of their cost per quality-adjusted life
year (QALY), which means that it tends to overlook benefits that do not come in
the form of quality-adjusted life-years. If we take seriously the importance of
wide-scope benefits, this limitation threatens to make traditional CEA incoherent. The problem for traditional CEA is that if we consider wide-scope costs
when deciding which health interventions receive priority, it is difficult to see
why we should not also consider wide-scope benefits. For instance, if reducing
the incidence of a communicable disease purely through spraying a pesticide
costs $5,000/QALY, while reducing it through a combination of environmental
remediation and spraying costs $7,000/QALY but also produces an extra $4,000
worth of non-health benefits for each QALY saved (for instance, because the
environmental remediation also improves the aesthetics of the ecosystem), it
would be strange to focus only on the higher costs of environmental remediation while ignoring its greater overall benefits.

29. Id. at 26.
30. Id. at 27.
31. Cf Susan Rose-Ackerman, Precaution,Proportionality,and Cost/Benefit Analysis: FalseAnalogies, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 281, 285 (2013) ("First of all, [cost-benefit analysis] is based on a normative
commitment to applied utilitarianism, and second, even given that normative perspective, it requires
one to make judgments that cannot be based solely on technical economic reasoning."); Alexander
Volokh, The Fifteenth Annual FrankelLecture: Commentary: Rationality or Rationalism? The Positive
and Normative Flaws of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 Hous. L. REv. 79, 82 (2011) (reporting that "[w]hen I
teach environmental law and economics, my students usually come in . . . skeptical of cost-benefit
analysis" and considering a variety of problems with the approach); Douglas A. Kysar, The Fifteenth
Annual FrankelLecture: Commentary: Politicsby Other Meanings:A Comment on "Retaking Rationality Two Years Later," 48 Hous. L. REv. 43, 76-77 (2011) ("Cost-benefit analysis is a language spoken
by few and dominated by even fewer. Its diction is poor though it purports to speak everything
meaningful.").
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In light of CEA's difficulty in effectively incorporating outcomes that do not
come in QALY terms, some have suggested adding other outcomes to CEA.
This approach is frequently referred to as extended cost-effectiveness analysis,
or ECEA. ECEA might, for instance, include use of scarce health system
capacity among the costs of a medical intervention, and protection against
financial risk among its benefits.3 2 ECEA approaches have been used in public
health to assess the potential benefits of treating tuberculosis and vaccinating
individuals against rotavirus. 3 3 The challenge for ECEA is to determine which
benefits other than QALYs and costs other than pecuniary costs should be
considered, and what priority to assign to these benefits and costs. 3 4
Regardless of whether CBA, CEA, or ECEA is employed, the value of having
a coordinating agency that assesses the wide-scope costs and benefits of regulations suggests that OMB should be permitted to retain its status as a coordinating evaluator of regulations. Additionally, it suggests the potential value of
introducing an actor like OMB into administrative arenas other than the U.S.
federal government. Some commentators have lamented the absence of analysis
of state-level regulations, and have suggested that states should create agencies
analogous to OIRA:
Although it is true that, at the federal level, cost-benefit analysis is an
accepted practice, it is true in part because the federal government has
adopted a centralized system of regulatory review. With no New York State or
New York City analogue of the federal Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, how would a cost-benefit analysis of public health regulations happen? The members of the Board are doctors and public health specialists, not
economists. The city or state could establish an analogue of OIRA, or, at a
minimum, the Board could be required to consider and make findings about
the material consequences-intended or unintended-of regulations that it
35
proposes.
Happily for those advocating the extension of the OIRA model to state administrative agencies, some have found that economic evaluation of regulations is
already in progress at the state level. A 2003 law review article claimed that "A
recent survey of state regulatory review structures notes that some states
'strongly encourage the use of cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness
analysis' by state administrative agencies, and that 'I[o]ver half of the states

32. Dean T. Jamison, Cost Effectiveness Analysis: Concepts and Applications, in 2 OXFORD TEXT767-82 (R. Detels et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009).
33. Stephane Verguet et al., Universal Public Finance of Tuberculosis Treatment in India: An
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Extended Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 24 HEALTH ECONOMICS 318 (2015).
34. Stephane Verguet et al., Public Finance of Rotavirus Vaccination in India and Ethiopia: An
Extended Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 31 VACCINE 4902 (2013).
35. Katherine Pratt, Lessons from the Demise of the Sugary Drink Portion Cap Rule, 5 WAKE FOREST
J. L. & PoL'Y 39, 101 (2015).
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require agencies to assess the economic impact of all proposed rules."' 3 6
Another article observes that "states are in the middle of a wave of implementation and refinement of their rudimentary systems for economic analysis as a
means of regulatory reform, with the endorsement and encouragement of
institutions such as the National Governor's Association." 3 7
B. Emphasizing Public Administrators'RoleObligation to Promote the Public
Good
While the OIRA model of centralized review of proposed regulations for their
wide-scope impacts could prevent the worst examples of the Gift of the Magi
Problem, it does not prevent agencies from wasting their time and resources
crafting proposed policies that are ultimately judged to be counterproductive.
The development of such policies is not only wasteful at the agency level, but
also places more work on the centralized reviewer and exposes that reviewer to
the possibility that, under pressure from a flood of counterproductive regulations, some will be let through due to error or political pressure. Analogously,
some have argued that micro-level decision makers like physicians must be
empowered and encouraged to consider cost-effectiveness, because relying
solely on macro-level approval bodies to contain costs will be undermined by
physicians' lack of commitment to cost-effectiveness. 38 In contrast, an "all
hands on deck" approach would empower actors at every level of the scientific
and regulatory process to promote the use of cost-effective interventions. 3 9
One way of implementing an "all hands on deck" approach would be to
encourage public administrators to embrace a code of professional ethics in
which they promote the interests of all, rather than furthering the aims of a
particular sector. The Association for Public Administration has promulgated
such a code, directing its members to be committed to advancing "the good of
the public as a whole, taking into account current and long-term interests of the
society" and that they must also "[s]ubordinate personal interests and institutional loyalties to the public good." 4 0 This language strongly suggests that
public administrators should prioritize the public good over the good of particular policy sectors. (Interestingly, the "good of the public as a whole" clause
departs from an earlier version of the code.) 4 1 The code also addresses the

36. Matthew Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1392 (2003); see also Richard Whisnant & Diane DeWitt Cherry, Economic
Analysis of Rules: Devolution, Evolution, and Realism, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 693, 694 n.2 (1996)
(collecting state statutes).
37. Whisnant & Cherry, supra note 36, at 695.
38. Peter A. Ubel & Robert M. Arnold, The UnbearableRightness of Bedside Rationing: Physician
Duties in a Climate of Cost Containment, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1837 (1995).
39. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Andrew Steinmetz, Will Physicians Lead on Controlling Health Care
Costs?, 310 JAMA 374 (2013).
40. AMERICAN Soc'Y FOR PUBLIC ADMIN., PRACTICES To PROMOTE THE ASPA CODE OF ETHICS (2013),
http://www.aspanet.org/aspadocs/practices%20with%20revisions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FZ3J-292N].
41. See id. at 1.
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danger of interest group pressure when it directs administrators to "[b]e prepared to make decisions that may not be popular but that are in the public's best
interest." 4 2
Some may doubt that ethical codes can do much to influence behavior. There
is a small amount of empirical literature on this question, most of which focuses
on corporate rather than professional codes, and which provides some support
for the idea that ethics codes correlate with behavior change.4 3 However, as a
conceptual matter, we should expect that moral commitments frequently can
override pecuniary incentives individuals might have. As Amartya Sen points
out, the "rational fool" who strictly maximizes individual welfare interests is a
poor model for actual individual behavior, which frequently reflects moral
commitments." Rather, people are frequently honest and civic minded even
when they have no pecuniary motivation to be, particularly when their identity
involves a commitment to the relevant sort of civic-mindedness.
C. GreaterCross-Agency Collaboration
Another way of encouraging agencies to consider wide-scope impacts at an
earlier stage would be to bring individuals and groups who might be affected by
those impacts into the process of policy development. Many have argued for
"health in all policies" initiatives, in which policymakers from non-health
sectors are directed to consider the health effects of their proposals.
Such
initiatives should be paired with similar "all policies in health" efforts, which
empower health policymakers to consider the effects of their proposed policies
on the distribution of non-health goods and give them the tools to assess those
effects.
Going beyond the case of health, a case could be made that part of the
deliberative process within an agency should include representatives from other
agencies, who can bring their knowledge about ancillary effects to the table.
The same could be done through interaction between nongovernmental organizations. Introducing a broader range of perspectives could help to avoid tunnel
vision and attune decision makers to the wider consequences of their choices.

42. Id.
43. Margaret Anne Cleek & Sherry Lynn Leonard, Can Corporate Codes of Ethics Influence
Behavior?, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS 619 (1998); Donald L. McCabe, Linda Klebe Trevino, and Kenneth D.
Butterfield, The Influence of Collegiate and CorporateCodes of Conduct on Ethics-RelatedBehavior in
the Workplace, 6 Bus. ETHICS Q. 461 (1996).
44. Amartya K. Sen, RationalFools: A Critique of the BehavioralFoundationsof Economic Theory,
6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 332-35 (1977).
45. Ilona Kickbusch, Health in All Policies, BMJ (July 3, 2013) http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.
f4283.full [https://perma.cc/RS4P-VS26].
46. For two different approaches to this goal, see Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45
ARIz. ST. L.J. 183 (2013); Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L.
REv. 1629 (2011). Marisam reviews and argues for greater collaboration between agencies in policy
development, while McDonnell and Schwarcz argue for "contrarian" observers within agencies whose
analysis serves to make the agency's ultimate work product better.
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D. Performance-BasedBudgeting
Hausman claims that the philosopher and economist John Broome endorses
the approach of "defining the mission of the various state sectors ... to be to
promote well-being by manipulating the particular causal factors within the
purview of the particular state agency." 4 7 While Hausman rejects Broome's
approach of regarding general well-being as the ultimate end and an agency's
sectoral focus as merely a means to that end, I find that approach attractive, and
suggest more speculatively that performance-based budgeting could be a way of
developing it.
Under performance-based budgeting, health policymakers, for instance, will
develop proposals for employing health care to improve the common good;
policymakers in education will suggest employing educational resources to do
the same. Importantly, however, all policy actors will frame their proposals in
terms of contribution to the same ultimate end. Proposals selected for implementation will then be evaluated in terms of their contribution to the public good.
Under performance-based budgeting, "[s]uccessful programs may be rewarded
by continued funding, while unsuccessful ones must improve or risk losing their
funding to other programs." 48 Despite regulatory efforts to embrace performancebased budgeting, the program has not been widely adopted on the federal
level.4 9
CONCLUSION

Many aspects of current practice encourage public administrators to adopt a
tunnel-vision approach that attends only to one aspect of the public good: the
benefits (and harms) that relate closely to the domain in which the administrator
is expert. In contrast, effects in other domains are frequently ignored entirely,
and generally given a much lower priority.
This article has argued that the tunnel-vision approach should be replaced
with a wider lens. Administrative agencies and public administrators should
ensure that the evidence base for interventions considers their wide-scope costs
and benefits, and should put more resources into conducting empirical studies
that take a broad approach to social costs and benefits. Agencies and administrators should also collaborate cross-sectorally in order to learn about and more
effectively weigh the impacts of their proposed intervention. An approach to
policy that does these things will not invariably maximize outcomes in any one
sector, but it will more effectively improve the lives of the individuals it serves.

47. Hausman, supra note 2, at 5.
48. C. Putnam, Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy (Little
Hoover Commission), 15 CAL. REG. L. REP. at 27 (1995).
49. Seth D. Harris, Managing for Social Change: Improving Labor Department Performance in a
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